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Using s. 26 Equality Act 2010 to combat institutional antisemitism: a critical 
race perspective on Fraser v University and College Union1  
On 25th August 2011 Ronnie Fraser, acting through his lawyer Anthony Julius, 
brought a claim in the Central London Employment Tribunal against the University 
and College Union under sections 57 and 26 Equality Act 2010. He alleged 
institutional antisemitism in the union which harassed him as a Jew. On 22nd March 
2013 the Tribunal delivered a lengthy judgment dismissing all ten grounds of Fraser's 
complaint as unfounded and mostly time-barred.  
There is a widely held belief in the UK that Jews benefit from the protection of the 
equality legislation. While this is certainly true in theory, this does not appear to be 
the case in practice. To date, every Jewish claimant in a reported discrimination case 
has failed in their claim against a Christian defendant.2 According to critical race 
theorists, anti-discrimination legislation does not effectively oppose and combat 
racism because it fails to understand the nature of racism; it is interpreted by judges 
who fail to understand the experience of racism; and because the racism that 
pervades our society also pervades our legal system and may be uncovered in 
analytical approaches and judicial decisions. This paper attempts to consider two 
specific critical race theory claims in relation to antisemitism and the judgment in 
Fraser v UCU. My concern is not so much with the construction of the legislation as 
with the wider institutional and ideological context in which it functions. 
1. The courts' adherence to legal formalism resulting in the law's failure to address 
the experience and nature of racism 
In her book, An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness, & English Law3, critical 
legal scholar Didi Herman notes the practice of English courts to adhere to legal 
formalism in a variety of cases involving Jewish litigants and Jewish issues. She 
believes that legal formalism is a judicial route that is consciously chosen "in order to 
marginalise extrinsic political factors."4 It imposes Christian norms and values5 on 
the law making the Jewish experience and Jewish commitments marginal or deviant 
with the result that the claims of Jewish litigants are defeated and their lived 
experiences are marginalised. Thus, she claims, legal formalism is ideologically 
driven by 'extrinsic' projects of racialization6. Here, she draws on the work of critical 
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race theorist Peter Fitzpatrick who has written about the privileging of legal formalism 
in cases involving anti-black racism. 
Legal formalism is the liberal position that says that law can be separated from the 
social world in which it is embedded. It draws a distinction between pure law and its 
social, economic and political contexts and denies the importance that context has in 
understanding the law. The privileging of formalism in cases involving race prevents 
the law from addressing racism because race or ethnicity is an account of social 
being; it is the lived experience. 
A good illustration of the privileging of legal formalism resulting in the law's failure to 
address the experience and nature of racism is to be found in the Tribunal's 
interpretation of the statutory test for "harassment" in Fraser v UCU. Section 26 
Equality Act defines "harassment" as "unwanted conduct related to a relevant 
protected characteristic." To qualify as harassment, the conduct must "violate the 
victim's dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment" for him. In deciding whether the conduct has had that effect, the 
tribunal must take into account the victim's perception under s. 26 (1) (b). This is a 
subjective test. It must also take into account the other circumstances of the case, 
and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect under s. 26 (4) (c). 
This is an objective test.  
To interpret the subjective component of s. 26, the Tribunal was required to focus on 
Fraser's realm of experience in the UCU. This it obtained from his written account in 
his witness statement and his oral evidence during examination and cross-
examination. The Tribunal then had to decide whether his written and oral account of 
his experiences in the union satisfied the statutory language of s. 26(1) (b) so as to 
amount to unlawful harassment.  
The Tribunal decided to give the statutory language a strict, narrow construction so 
as to deny Fraser's experience of antisemitism in the union. Stressing that it "must 
not cheapen the significance of [the] words [used]", it declared that an effect capable 
of amounting to harassment had not been made out by Fraser who had used words 
such as "upsetting", "disappointment," "troubled" "hurt", "saddened and amazed," to 
describe the effect the union's conduct had on him. The Tribunal thought that these 
words indicated "minor upsets" caused by "trivial acts" rather than antisemitic 
harassment (para 38). This was despite the fact that Fraser impressed the Tribunal 
as a "sincere witness" whose "displays of emotion" during his evidence had not been 
synthetic (para. 147). The Tribunal attributed Fraser's emotion to the fact that the 
litigation was important to his "passionate belief" in the pro-Israel political campaign 
within the union, rather than to his reliving his experiences of antisemitism while 
giving evidence (para 147). 
 In this way the Tribunal denied Fraser's experiences of antisemitism within the UCU 
because he did not speak his perception and relay his experiences using the correct 
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language. This is the privileging of legal formalism. By denying that Fraser's 
subjective account of antisemitism satisfied the statutory language, the Tribunal 
imposed Christian norms and values on the law permitting the marginalisation of the 
minority experience. These Christian norms and values have, according to Herman, 
become synonymous with English secular norms and values. The lack of recognition 
or misrecognition of Fraser's suffering within the union is deeply problematic. Indeed, 
it has been observed by critical legal philosophers that the "[L]aw's abstraction and 
formalism is a type of disrespect that calls for greater sensitivity to social context and 
to individual need and desire."7  
The question is why did the Tribunal construe the statutory language so narrowly? It 
did, after all, have a choice. It is acknowledged by critical legal scholars that while 
the meaning of legal text appears to be determinate, the judge is free to interpret it 
as he chooses. This is particularly the case with statutory wording, where even the 
literal interpretation of a word can yield several different meanings. Is it the case that 
the Tribunal wanted to deny Fraser's claim because it really did believe that his 
professed experiences of antisemitism did not amount to anything more than "minor 
upsets" caused by "trivial acts"? If so, then this might suggest that the Tribunal could 
not grasp Fraser's subjective experience of anti-Semitism within the union because 
his reality was outside their realm of experience. Critical race theorists have 
observed that judges cannot understand racial discrimination because it is positional, 
that is, it requires an understanding of the lived reality of race. Or it could be that the 
problem lay with the statutory wording. Critical legal theorist Clare Dalton has noted 
that the law shapes all stories into particular patterns of telling, that it favours certain 
kinds of stories, disfavours others, and even makes it impossible to tell certain kinds 
of stories. It may be on this view that antisemitism is one story that is impossible to 
tell because it is not considered to be a serious problem (as in this case), and 
because it is not as readily recognisable as, say, anti-black racism, sexism, or 
homophobia. Antisemitism is a complex phenomenon. Its interpretation demands a 
subtle and nuanced approach that resists easy conclusions. 
A more plausible explanation is that the Tribunal chose to construe the statutory 
wording so as to deny Fraser's subjective experience of antisemitism because it 
disliked the allegation of contemporay antisemitism, preferring to regard the UCU's 
irrational hostility to Israel in terms of free political speech. This preferred explanation 
has wide support within the judgment. The Tribunal refused to rule on a meaning or 
definition of antisemitism on the grounds that there were legitimately held differences 
of view on what constitutes antisemitism and thought that where the line should be 
drawn in relation to when criticism of Israel becomes antisemitic is the "stuff of 
political debate" (para 53). The Tribunal discredited Fraser's witnesses' evidence of 
antisemitism as the mere ventilation of opinions and, indeed, dismissed all the 
evidence of antisemitism in the union with the words "[…] we had to remind 
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ourselves frequently that despite appearances, we were not conducting a public 
inquiry into antisemitism but considering a legal claim for unlawful harassment" (para 
180). It was a claim for unlawful antisemitic harassment but this did not prevent the 
Tribunal from ignoring all the evidence of antisemitism. This amounts to a denial of 
antisemitism. 
The Tribunal's three references to the Holocaust8 emphasised the legitimacy of this 
denial. Herman claims that English judges frequently use the Holocaust as a 
"mnemonic device" in cases involving Jews to achieve certain purposes, such as to 
delegitimize claims of contemporary antisemitism. According to Fine and Seymour a 
Holocaust reference helps to do this because it associates antisemitism with state-
sponsored genocide in the 'old' Europe, consigning it to history as a result of the 
defeat of fascism and the rise of the 'new' postnational Europe and the development 
of the European Convention on Human Rights9.This constructs Jews as deserving 
victims of persecution in the past but not in the present.10 Additionally, as Herman 
notes, a Holocaust reference helps to portray judges as sympathetic, or at least as 
not indifferent to, Jewish persecution and suffering, while at the same time denying a 
claim for discrimination.11   
To return to the privileging of legal formalism, critical race theorists claim that 
formalists use abstract concepts like "reasonableness" to mask choices and value 
judgments. This can be illustrated in the Tribunal's interpretation of the objective 
component of s. 26. The Tribunal said that even if it was satisfied that Fraser's 
subjective perception satisfied the statutory test for harassment under s. 26 (1) (b), it 
would not be reasonable for it to have that effect under s. 26 (4) (c). This was 
because Fraser was a willing participant in the political arena. The Tribunal stated, 
"[Mr Fraser] is a campaigner. He chooses to engage in the politics of the union in 
support of Israel and in opposition to activists for the Palestinian cause. When a 
rugby player takes the field he must accept his fair share of minor injuries. Similarly, 
a political activist accepts the risk of being offended or hurt on occasions by things 
said or done by his opponents (who themselves take on a corresponding risk) [….]"12 
                                            
8
 At the beginning, the Tribunal introduced Fraser as "the child of Jewish refugees who fled Nazi 
Germany in 1939" and advised us that "[M]embers of his family died in the Holocaust" (para 2); and 
later made an oblique reference to it with the words "[S]o long and terrible has been the persecution 
of the Jewish people through history […] (para 51).  
 
9
 Robert Fine, Nationalism, Postnationalism, Antisemitism: Thoughts on the Politics of Jurgen 
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Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 43, No. 5, 2009, p 459-479; David Seymour, Critical Theory: the Holocaust, 
Human Rights and Antisemitism, CLT Conference Paper, Harvard Law School, March 2013; David 
Seymour, Holocaust Memory: Between Universal and Particular, unpublished paper, June 2014.. 
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 The Tribunal continued, "These activites are not for everyone. Given his election to engage in, and 
persist with, a political debate which by its nature is bound to excite strong emotions, it would, I think, 
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(para 156). The Tribunal interpreted the statutory requirement of "reasonableness" 
from the perspective of a political activist rather than from the perspective of a 
Jewish union member with a connection to Israel or, indeed, from the perspective of 
a victim of antisemitism. The Tribunal had a choice as to whose reasonableness to 
adopt. Its choice wrongly assumes that minorities who are politically active in the 
fight against racism have greater thresholds of fortitude than those who are not. This 
shows a marked failure to address the experience and nature of racism.13  
2) The pervasiveness of racism in the legal system: uncovering the racism in judicial 
discourse and decisions. 
Critical race theorists claim that racism can be uncovered in judicial discourse and 
decisions. Herman notes the practice of "orientalising" and "racializing" in a range of 
English cases involving Jews and Jewish issues. She uses the term 'orientalism' to 
signify a particular way of characterising Jews and Jewish issues so as to mark them 
out as 'eastern' and un-English. This frequently involves comparing Jews and Jewish 
practices to those of other civilisations, especially the Christian one, which is held up 
as eminently superior and is equated with that which is 'English'. This is a 
"racializing" discourse because Jews and Jewish practices are understood and 
represented as inferior to Christianity. It is also a racializing discourse, in my view, 
because it relies on, and reproduces, anti-Semitic ways of thinking. There are 
several examples of orientalising and racializing judicial discourse in Fraser v UCU. 
 The Tribunal characterised the case as one in which Fraser, his Jewish lawyer, and 
his witnesses wanted to abrogate free political speech in the union in order to shield 
Israel from criticism. It said "[A]t heart, [this litigation] represents an impermissible 
attempt to achieve a political end by litigious means" (para. 178). This is David 
Hirsh's Livingstone Formulation.14 It may be said to be racializing discourse because 
it involves accusing those who raise legitimate concerns about contemporary 
antisemitism - usually Jews - of acting in bad faith. They are playing the 
"antisemitism" card merely to prevent Israel from being criticised. On this view 
contemporary antisemitism is denied and all criticism of Israel is regarded as 
legitimate. The Livingstone Formulation is a common trope of contemporary 
antisemitism and its central role in the Tribunal's attitude to Fraser's case illustrates 
                                                                                                                                       
require special circumstances to justify a finding that such involvement had resulted in harassment." 
(para 156). 
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 David Hirsh has noted that "this reasoning results in the position that since Fraser took on the 
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the critical race theory claim that the racism that pervades society pervades the 
judicial process15. 
 The Livingstone Formulation also invokes the spectre of Jewish particularism, which 
was a strong theme throughout the judgment. The Tribunal thought that Fraser's 
Jewish particularism was so strong that he and his team had been willing to abuse 
the Employment Tribunal as well as misuse the Equality Act in their self-serving 
pursuit of preventing the union from criticising Israel. It said "[T]he Employment 
Tribunals are a hard-pressed public service and it is not right that their limited 
resources should be squandered as they have been in this case" (para 178).  
Specifically, the Tribunal characterised the case as one of Jewish particularism 
versus the universal right to freedom of expression, a right enshrined in Article 10 of 
the ECHR and protected under sections 3 & 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and 
concluded that "[T]he narrow interests of [Mr Fraser] must give way to the wider 
public interest in ensuring that freedom of expression is safeguarded" (para. 156).  
This reasoning suggests that freedom of expression cases, or cases that are 
characterised as freedom of expression cases, will - and indeed, should - work 
against Jewish claimants. I say cases that are characterised as freedom of 
expression cases because this was not a speech harassment case at all. Fraser's 
primary case was that the UCU had persistently failed to do things for him contrary to 
its assurances that it would and was based on a series of acts and omissions.  
Jewish particularism raised its ugly head further in the Tribunal's characterisation of 
Fraser and his team as opposed to pluralism and tolerance. The Tribunal said it was 
"troubled by the implications of the claim" because "[U]nderlying it we sense a 
worrying disregard for pluralism, tolerance and freedom of expression" (para 179). 
The pitting of Jew against freedom of expression, pluralism and tolerance amounts 
to an orientalising of the Jew because these are universal rights and values that are 
associated with western Christian Europe. In this way Jews are represented and 
understood as inferior to Christianity and as Eastern in the sense of 'un-English'. 
Further, because human rights are associated with the Enlightenment and with 
democracy, Jews are represented and understood as not fully enlightened and as 
un-democratic. This is a racializing discourse which echoes the Tribunal's view that 
Fraser was trying to interfere with the democratic processes within the union, which 
merely wanted to uphold the principle of free speech and provide an arena for 
members to engage with each other on matters of pressing political concern, such as 
the Israel/Palestine conflict.16  
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 It was the spectre of Jewish particularism that was also responsible for the 
Tribunal's rejection of Fraser's claim that an attachment to Israel is relevant to his 
Jewish identity (para 150). By rejecting the attachment of Jews to Israel, the Tribunal 
rejected Jewish nationalism and Jewish particularism in favour of a "race-less" post-
national post-Holocaust Europe with its guarantee of universal rights. This reinforces 
the Tribunal's denial of contemporary antisemitism. In the post-national, post-
Holocaust Europe, antisemitism is a thing of the past. I also believe that that the 
failure to acknowledge Jewish national rights is evidence of the anti-Zionist leanings 
of the Tribunal. 
Other racialized thinking about Jews is evident in the Tribunal's application of 
unattractive characteristics to Fraser and many of his witnesses. Herman notes that 
judicial assessments of 'character' are often dependent on notions of race. Their 
unattractiveness is found in their "un-English" behaviour, such as 'playing to the 
gallery', 'scoring points', 'ventilating opinions', behaving in a 'tactical' manner and 
being 'untruthful'. In an echo of Fraser's Good Jew /Bad Jew distinction, the Tribunal  
indulged in a Good Witness/Bad Witness distinction by juxtaposing their behaviour 
against that of the UCU witnesses, each of whom gave careful and accurate 
evidence and stuck to the facts (para 149). The notion of 'playing fair' is a Christian 
one, and the exclusion of emotional witnesses for Fraser avoided the political 
colouring of their testimony, which was problematic for the Tribunal. 
Conclusion. 
A common thread in my analysis has been the exclusion of the 'political', albeit with 
'political' as a dangeously free-foating factor. Fraser's passion17 is merely 'political'; 
hostility to Israel is merely 'political'; Fraser is merely a 'political campaigner.' We 
have seen the 'political' excluded at the general level of the law with a strict, narrow 
interpretation of s. 26 (1) (b) Equality Act which insulated it against policy and 
thereby prevented different forms of linguistic expression from satisfying the 
subjective test for 'harassment'. We have also seen the exclusion of the 'political' at 
the specific level of evidence, with evidence of antisemitism treated as inauthentic or 
irrelevant. This type of exclusion, at the specific level of the evidence, is central to 
critical race theory critique because it is a strategic blindness to facts on ideological 
grounds. The mixture of the general and specific exclusion of the political in Fraser v 
UCU sensitises us to the different ways in which the judicial application of dominant 
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